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young to be steeled by familiarity with the iron trade to which he was devoted. It may be fair, however, to charge this on the age rather than on the individual, for surely never was there one characterized by greater brutality, and more unsparing ferocity in its wars.²⁴ So little had the progress of civilization done for humanity. It is not until a recent period, that a more generous spirit has operated; that a fellow-creature has been understood not to forfeit his rights as a man, because he is an enemy; that conventional laws have been established, tending greatly to mitigate the evils of a condition, which with every alleviation is one of unspeakable misery; and that those who hold the destinies of nations in their hands have been made to feel, that there is less true glory, and far less profit, to be derived from war, than from the wise prevention of it.

The defeat at Ravenna struck a panic into the confederates. The stout heart of Julius the Second faltered, and it required all the assurances of the Spanish and Venetian ministers to keep him staunch to his purpose. King Ferdinand issued orders to the Great Captain to hold himself in readiness for

²⁴ One example may suffice, occurring in the war of the League, in 1510. When Vicenza was taken by the Imperialists, a number of the inhabitants, amounting to one, or, according to some accounts, six thousand, took refuge in a neighbouring grotto, with their wives and children, comprehending many of the principal families of the place. A French officer, detecting their retreat, caused a heap of fagots to be piled up at the mouth of the cavern and set on fire. Out

of the whole number of fugitives only one escaped with life; and the blackened and convulsed appearance of the bodies showed too plainly the cruel agonies of suffocation. (*Mémoires de Bayard*, chap. 40. — Bembo, *Istoria Viniziana*, tom. ii. lib. 10.) Bayard executed two of the authors of this diabolical act on the spot. But the "chevalier sans reproche" was an exception to, rather than an example of, the prevalent spirit of the age.

taking the command of forces to be instantly raised for Naples. There could be no better proof of the royal consternation.²⁵

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The victory of Ravenna, however, was more fatal to the French than to their foes. The uninterrupted successes of a commander are so far unfortunate, that they incline his followers, by the brilliant illusion they throw around his name, to rely less on their own resources, than on him whom they have hitherto found invincible; and thus subject their own destiny to all the casualties which attach to the fortunes of a single individual. The death of Gaston de Foix seemed to dissolve the only bond which held the French together. The officers became divided, the soldiers disheartened, and, with the loss of their young hero, lost all interest in the service. The allies, advised of this disorderly state of the army, recovered confidence, and renewed their exertions. Through Ferdinand's influence over his son-in-law, Henry the Eighth of England, the latter had been induced openly to join the League in the beginning of the present year.²⁶ The Catholic king had the address, moreover, just before the battle to detach the emperor from

The French
retreat.

²⁵ Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. v. lib. 10, pp. 310-312, 322, 323. — *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 3, cap. 7. — Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 30, cap. 9. — Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 3, p. 288. — Carbajal, *Anales*, MS., año 1512. — See also *Lettera di Vettori*, Maggio 16, 1514, apud Machiavelli, *Opere*.

²⁶ Dumont, *Corps Diplomatique*, tom. iv. p. 137.

He had become a party to it as early as November 17, of the preceding year; he deferred its publication, however, until he had received the last instalment of a subsidy, that Louis XII. was to pay him for the maintenance of peace. (Rymer, *Fœdera*, tom. xiii. pp. 311-323. — Sismondi, *Hist. des Français*, tom. xv. p. 385.) Even the chivalrous Harry the Eighth could not escape the trickish spirit of the age.

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June 28.

Venice dis-
gusted.

France, by effecting a truce between him and Venice.²⁷ The French, now menaced and pressed on every side, began their retreat under the brave La Palice, and, to such an impotent state were they reduced, that, in less than three months after the fatal victory, they were at the foot of the Alps, having abandoned not only their recent, but all their conquests in the north of Italy.²⁸

The same results now took place as in the late war against Venice. The confederates quarrelled over the division of the spoil. The republic, with the largest claims, obtained the least concessions. She felt that she was to be made to descend to an inferior rank in the scale of nations. Ferdinand earnestly remonstrated with the pope, and subsequently, by means of his Venetian minister, with Maximilian, on this mistaken policy.²⁹ But the indifference of the one, and the cupidity of the other, were closed against argument. The result was precisely what the prudent monarch foresaw. Venice was driven into the arms of her perfidious ancient ally, and on the 23d of March, 1513, a definitive treaty was arranged with France for their mutual defence.³⁰ Thus the most efficient member was alienated from the confederacy. All the recent advantages of the allies were compromised. New

1513.

²⁷ Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. v. lib. 10, p. 320.

²⁸ *Mémoires de Bayard*, chap. 55. — *Fleurange, Mémoires*, chap. 31. — *Ferreras, Hist. d'Espagne*, tom. viii. pp. 380, 391. — Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. v. lib. 10, pp. 335, 336. — *Zurita, Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 20.

²⁹ *Zurita, Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 44 - 48. — Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. vi. lib. 11, p. 52.

Martyr reports a conversation that he had with the Venetian minister in Spain, touching this business. *Opus Epist.*, epist. 520.

³⁰ *Dumont, Corps Diplomatique*, tom. iv. part. 1, no. 86.

combinations were to be formed, and new and interminable prospects of hostility opened.

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Ferdinand, relieved from immediate apprehensions of the French, took comparatively little interest in Italian politics. He was too much occupied with settling his conquests in Navarre. The army, indeed, under Cardona still kept the field in the north of Italy. The viceroy, after reëstablishing the Medici in Florence, remained inactive. The French, in the mean while, had again mustered in force, and crossing the mountains encountered the Swiss in a bloody battle at Novara, where the former were entirely routed. Cardona, then rousing from his lethargy, traversed the Milanese without opposition, laying waste the ancient territories of Venice, burning the palaces and pleasure-houses of its lordly inhabitants on the beautiful banks of the Brenta, and approaching so near to the "Queen of the Adriatic," as to throw a few impotent balls into the monastery of San Secondo.

Battle of
Novara.

1513.
June 6.

The indignation of the Venetians and of Alviano, the same general who had fought so gallantly under Gonsalvo at the Garigliano, hurried them into an engagement with the allies near La Motta, at two miles' distance from Vicenza. Cardona, loaded with booty and entangled among the mountain passes, was assailed under every disadvantage. The German allies gave way before the impetuous charge of Alviano, but the Spanish infantry stood its ground unshaken, and by extraordinary discipline and valor succeeded in turning the fortunes of the day. More than four thousand of the enemy

Of La Motta.

Oct. 7.

The Spaniards victorious.

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were left on the field, and a large number of prisoners, including many of rank, with all the baggage and artillery, fell into the hands of the victors.³¹

Thus ended the campaign of 1513; the French driven again beyond the mountains; Venice cooped up within her sea-girt fastnesses, and compelled to enrol her artisans and common laborers in her defence,—but still strong in resources, above all in the patriotism and unconquerable spirit of her people.³²

³¹ Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. vi. lib. 11, pp. 101–138.—Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.*, epist. 523.—Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 30, cap. 21.—Fleurange, *Mémoires*, chap. 36, 37.—Also an original letter of King Ferdinand to Archbishop Deza, apud Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS., cap. 242.

Alviano died a little more than a year after this defeat, at sixty years of age. He was so much beloved

by the soldiery, that they refused to be separated from his remains, which were borne at the head of the army for some weeks after his death. They were finally laid in the church of St. Stephen in Venice; and the senate, with more gratitude than is usually conceded to republics, settled an honorable pension on his family.

³² Daru, *Hist. de Venise*, tom. iii. pp. 615, 616.

Daru's *Histoire de Venise*.

Count Daru has supplied the desideratum, so long standing, of a full, authentic history of a state, whose institutions were the admiration of earlier times, and whose long stability and success make them deservedly an object of curiosity and interest to our own. The style of the work, at once lively and condensed, is not that best suited to historic writing, being of the piquant, epigrammatic kind, much affected by French writers. The subject, too, of the revolutions of empire, does not afford room for the dramatic interest, attaching to works which admit of more extended biographical development. Abundant interest will be found, however, in the dexterity with which he has disentangled the tor-

tuous politics of the republic; in the acute and always sensible reflections with which he clothes the dry skeleton of fact; and in the novel stores of information he has opened. The foreign policy of Venice excited too much interest among friends and enemies in the day of her glory, not to occupy the pens of the most intelligent writers. But no Italian chronicler, not even one intrusted with the office by the government itself, has been able to exhibit the interior workings of the complicated machinery so satisfactorily as M. Daru has done, with the aid of those voluminous state papers, which were as jealously guarded from inspection, until the downfall of the republic, as the records of the Spanish Inquisition.

CHAPTER XXIII.

CONQUEST OF NAVARRE.

1512—1513.

Sovereigns of Navarre. — Ferdinand demands a Passage. — Invasion and Conquest of Navarre. — Treaty of Orthès. — Ferdinand settles his Conquests. — His Conduct examined: — Gross Abuse of the Victory.

WHILE the Spaniards were thus winning barren laurels on the fields of Italy, King Ferdinand was making a most important acquisition of territory nearer home. The reader has already been made acquainted with the manner in which the bloody sceptre of Navarre passed from the hands of Eleanor, Ferdinand's sister, after a reign of a few brief days, into those of her grandson Phœbus. A fatal destiny hung over the house of Foix; and the latter prince lived to enjoy his crown only four years, when he was succeeded by his sister Catharine.

It was not to be supposed, that Ferdinand and Isabella, so attentive to enlarge their empire to the full extent of the geographical limits which nature seemed to have assigned it, would lose the oppor-

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tunity now presented of incorporating into it the hitherto independent kingdom of Navarre, by the marriage of their own heir with its sovereign. All their efforts, however, were frustrated by the queen mother Magdaleine, sister of Louis the Eleventh, who, sacrificing the interests of the nation to her prejudices, evaded the proposed match, under various pretexts, and in the end effected a union between her daughter and a French noble, Jean d'Albret, heir to considerable estates in the neighbourhood of Navarre. This was a most fatal error. The independence of Navarre had hitherto been maintained less through its own strength, than the weakness of its neighbours. But, now that the petty states around her had been absorbed into two great and powerful monarchies, it was not to be expected, that so feeble a barrier would be longer respected, or that it would not be swept away in the first collision of those formidable forces. But, although the independence of the kingdom must be lost, the princes of Navarre might yet maintain their station by a union with the reigning family of France or Spain. By the present connexion with a mere private individual they lost both the one and the other.¹

Distrust of
Spain.

Still the most friendly relations subsisted between the Catholic king and his niece during the lifetime of Isabella. The sovereigns assisted her in taking possession of her turbulent dominions, as well as in allaying the deadly feuds of the Beau-

¹ See Part I. Chapters 10, 12.

monts and Agramonts, with which they were rent asunder. They supported her with their arms in resisting her uncle Jean, viscount of Narbonne, who claimed the crown on the groundless pretext of its being limited to male heirs.² The alliance with Spain was drawn still closer by the avowed purpose of Louis the Twelfth to support his nephew, Gaston de Foix, in the claims of his deceased father.³ The death of the young hero, however, at Ravenna, wholly changed the relations and feelings of the two countries. Navarre had nothing immediately to fear from France. She felt distrust of Spain on more than one account, especially for the protection afforded the Beaumontese exiles, at the head of whom was the young count of Lerin, Ferdinand's nephew.⁴

France, too, standing alone, and at bay against the rest of Europe, found the alliance of the little state of Navarre of importance to her, especially at the present juncture, when the project of an expedition against Guienne, by the combined armies of Spain and England, naturally made Louis the Twelfth desirous to secure the good-will of a prince, who might be said to wear the keys of the Pyrenees, as the king of Sardinia did those of the Alps, at his girdle. With these amicable dispositions, the king and queen of Navarre despatched

Negotiations
with France.

² Histoire du Royaume de Navarre, pp. 567, 570. — Aleson, Annales de Navarre, tom. v. lib. 34, cap. 1; fol. — Diccionario Geográfico-Histórico de España, por la Real Academia de la Historia, (Madrid, 1802,) tom. ii. p. 117.

³ Aleson, Annales de Navarre, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 13. — Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 9, cap. 54. — Sismondi, Hist. des Français, tom. xv. p. 500.

⁴ Aleson, Annales de Navarre, ubi supra.

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Ferdinand
demands a
passage.

June.

their plenipotentiaries to Blois, early in May, soon after the battle of Ravenna, with full powers to conclude a treaty of alliance and confederation with the French government.⁵

In the mean time, June 8th, an English squadron arrived at Passage, in Guipuscoa, having ten thousand men on board under Thomas Grey, marquis of Dorset,⁶ in order to coöperate with King Ferdinand's army in the descent on Guienne. This latter force, consisting of two thousand five hundred horse, light and heavy, six thousand foot, and twenty pieces of artillery, was placed under Don Fadrique de Toledo, the old duke of Alva, grandfather of the general, who wrote his name in indelible characters of blood in the Netherlands, under Philip the Second.⁷ Before making any movement, however, Ferdinand, who knew the equivocal dispositions of the Navarrese sovereigns, determined to secure himself from the annoyance which their strong position enabled them to give him on whatever route he adopted. He accordingly sent to request a free passage through their dominions, with the demand, moreover, that they should in-

⁵ Dumont, Corps Diplomatique, tom. iv. part. 1, p. 147. — See also the king's letter to Deza, dated at Burgos, July 20th, 1512, apud Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 235.

⁶ Aleson, Annales de Navarre, tom. v. p. 245. — Herbert, Life and Raigne of Henry VIII., (London, 1649,) p. 20. — Holinshed, Chronicles, p. 568, (London, 1810.) — Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ix. p. 315.

His Valencian editors correct his

text, by substituting marquis of Dorchester!

⁷ The young poet, Garcilasso de la Vega, gives a brilliant sketch of this stern old nobleman in his younger days, such as our imagination would scarcely have formed of him at any period.

"Otro Marte'n guerra, en corte Febo.
Mostravase mancebo en las señales
del rostro, qu' eran tales, qu' esperança
i cierta confianza claro davan
a cuantos le miravan; qu' el seria,
en quien s' informaria un ser divino."

Obras, ed. de Herrera, p. 503.

trust six of their principal fortresses to such Navarrese as he should name, as a guaranty for their neutrality during the expedition. He accompanied this modest proposal with the alternative, that the sovereigns should become parties to the Holy League, engaging in that case to restore certain places in his possession, which they claimed, and pledging the whole strength of the confederacy to protect them against any hostile attempts of France.⁸

The situation of these unfortunate princes was in the highest degree embarrassing. The neutrality they had so long and sedulously maintained was now to be abandoned; and their choice, whichever party they espoused, must compromise their possessions on one or the other side of the Pyrenees, in exchange for an ally, whose friendship had proved by repeated experience quite as disastrous as his enmity. In this dilemma they sent ambassadors into Castile, to obtain some modification of the terms, or at least to protract negotiations till some definitive arrangement should be made with Louis the Twelfth.⁹

On the 17th of July, their plenipotentiaries signed a treaty with that monarch at Blois, by which France and Navarre mutually agreed to de-

Navarre al-
lied to
France.

⁸ Lebrija, De Bello Navariensi, lib. 1, cap. 3. — Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 4, 5. — Aleson, Annales de Navarre, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 15. — Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 488. — Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., ubi supra. — Garibay, Compendio, tom.

ii. lib. 29, cap. 25. — Sandoval, Hist. del Emp. Carlos V., tom. i. p. 25.

⁹ Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 7, 8. — Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 487. — Garibay, Compendio, tom. iii. lib. 29, cap. 25.

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fend each other, in case of attack, against all enemies whatever. By another provision, obviously directed against Spain, it was stipulated, that neither nation should allow a passage to the enemies of the other through its dominions. And, by a third, Navarre pledged herself to declare war on the English now assembled in Guipuscoa, and all those coöperating with them.¹⁰

Through a singular accident, Ferdinand was made acquainted with the principal articles of this treaty before its signature.¹¹ His army had remained inactive in its quarters around Victoria, ever since the landing of the English. He now saw the hopelessness of further negotiation, and, determining to anticipate the stroke prepared for him, commanded his general to invade without delay, and occupy Navarre.

The duke of Alva crossed the borders on the 21st of July, proclaiming that no harm should be offered to those who voluntarily submitted. On the 23d, he arrived before Pampelona. King John, who all the while he had been thus dallying with the lion, had made no provision for defence, had already abandoned his capital, leaving it to make the best terms it could for itself. On the following day, the

¹⁰ Dumont, Corps Diplomatique, tom. iv. part. 1, no. 69. — Carta del Rey a D. Diego Deza, apud Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 235.

¹¹ A confidential secretary of King Jean of Navarre was murdered in his sleep by his mistress. His papers, containing the heads of the proposed treaty with France,

fell into the hands of a priest of Pampelona, who was induced by the hopes of a reward to betray them to Ferdinand. The story is told by Martyr, in a letter dated July 18th, 1512. (Opus Epist., epist. 490.) Its truth is attested by the conformity of the proposed terms with those of the actual treaty.

city, having first obtained assurance of respect for all its franchises and immunities, surrendered; "a circumstance," devoutly exclaims King Ferdinand, "in which we truly discern the hand of our blessed Lord, whose miraculous interposition has been visible through all this enterprise, undertaken for the weal of the church, and the extirpation of the accursed schism."¹²

The royal exile, in the mean while, had retreated to Lumbier, where he solicited the assistance of the duke of Longueville, then encamped on the northern frontier for the defence of Bayonne. The French commander, however, stood too much in awe of the English, still lying in Guipuscoa, to weaken himself by a detachment into Navarre; and the unfortunate monarch, unsupported, either by his own subjects or his new ally, was compelled to cross the mountains, and take refuge with his family in France.¹³

¹² Carta del Rey a D. Diego Deza, Burgos, July 26th, apud Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 236. — Histoire du Royaume de Navarre, pp. 620-627. — Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 21. — Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 495. — Aleson, Annales de Navarre, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 15.

Bernaldez has incorporated into his chronicle several letters of King Ferdinand, written during the progress of the war. It is singular, that, coming from so high a source, they should not have been more freely resorted to by the Spanish writers. They are addressed to his confessor, Deza, archbishop of Seville, with whom Bernaldez, curate

of a parish in his diocese, was, as appears from other parts of his work, on terms of intimacy.

¹³ Aleson, Annales de Navarre, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 15. — Histoire du Royaume de Navarre, p. 622. — Lebrija, De Bello Navariensi, lib. 1, cap. 4. — "Jean d'Albret you were born," said Catharine to her unfortunate husband, as they were flying from their kingdom, "and Jean d'Albret you will die. Had I been king, and you queen, we had been reigning in Navarre at this moment." (Garibay, Compendio, tom. iii. lib. 29, cap. 26.) Father Abarca treats the story as an old wife's tale, and Garibay as an old woman for repeating it. Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 21.

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quered.

The duke of Alva lost no time in pressing his advantage; opening the way by a proclamation of the Catholic king, that it was intended only to hold possession of the country as security for the pacific disposition of its sovereigns, until the end of his present expedition against Guienne. From whatever cause, the Spanish general experienced so little resistance, that in less than a fortnight he overran and subdued nearly the whole of Upper Navarre. So short a time sufficed for the subversion of a monarchy, which, in defiance of storm and stratagem, had maintained its independence unimpaired, with a few brief exceptions, for seven centuries.¹⁴

On reviewing these extraordinary events, we are led to distrust the capacity and courage of a prince, who could so readily abandon his kingdom, without so much as firing a shot in its defence. John had shown, however, on more than one occasion, that he was destitute of neither. He was not, it must be confessed, of the temper best suited to the fierce and stirring times on which he was cast. He was of an amiable disposition, social and fond of pleasure, and so little jealous of his royal dignity, that he mixed freely in the dances and other entertainments of the humblest of his subjects. His greatest defect was the facility with which he reposed the cares of state on favorites, not always the most deserving. His greatest merit was his love of let-

¹⁴ Manifiesto del Rey D. Fernando, July 30th, apud Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 236. —

Lebrija, De Bello Navariensi, lib. 1, cap. 5. — Garibay, Compendio, tom. iii. lib. 29, cap. 26.

ters.¹⁵ Unfortunately, neither his merits nor defects were of a kind best adapted to extricate him from his present perilous situation, or enable him to cope with his wily and resolute adversary. For this, however, more commanding talents might well have failed. The period had arrived, when, in the regular progress of events, Navarre must yield up her independence to the two great nations on her borders; who, attracted by the strength of her natural position, and her political weakness, would be sure, now that their own domestic discords were healed, to claim each the moiety, which seemed naturally to fall within its own territorial limits. Particular events might accelerate or retard this result, but it was not in the power of human genius to avert its final consummation.

King Ferdinand, who descried the storm now gathering on the side of France, resolved to meet it promptly, and commanded his general to cross the mountains, and occupy the districts of Lower Navarre. In this he expected the coöperation of the English. But he was disappointed. The marquis of Dorset alleged, that the time consumed in the reduction of Navarre made it too late for the expedition against Guienne, which was now placed in a posture of defence. He loudly complained that his master had been duped by the Catholic king, who had used his ally to make conquests solely for himself; and, in spite of every remonstrance, he reëmbarked his whole force, with-

Discontent
of the Eng-
lish.

¹⁵ Aleson, *Annales de Navarra*, du Royaume de Navarre, pp. 603, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 2. — *Histoire* 604.

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Discomfiture of the French.

out waiting for orders ; " a proceeding," says Ferdinand in one of his letters, which " touches me most deeply, from the stain it leaves on the honor of the most serene king my son-in-law, and the glory of the English nation, so distinguished in times past for high and chivalrous emprise."¹⁶

The duke of Alva, thus unsupported, was no match for the French under Longueville, strengthened, moreover, by the veteran corps returned from Italy, with the brave La Palice. Indeed, he narrowly escaped being hemmed in between the two armies, and only succeeded in anticipating by a few hours the movements of La Palice, so as to make good his retreat through the pass of Roncesvalles, and throw himself into Pampelona.¹⁷ Hither he was speedily followed by the French general, accompanied by Jean d'Albret. On the 27th of November, the besiegers made a desperate, though ineffectual assault on the city, which was repeated with equal ill fortune on the two following days. The beleaguering forces, in the mean time, were straitened for provisions; and at length, after a siege of some weeks, on learning the arrival of fresh reinforcements under the duke of Najara,¹⁸ they broke up their encampment, and withdrew across

¹⁶ See the king's third letter to Deza, Logroño, November 12th, apud Bernaldez, *Reyes Católicos*, MS., cap. 236. — Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ii. lib. 30, cap. 12. — Lebrija, *De Bello Navariensi*, lib. 1, cap. 7. — Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.*, epist. 499. — Herbert, *Life of Henry VIII.*, p. 24. — Holinshed, *Chronicles*, p. 571.

¹⁷ Garcilasso de la Vega alludes

to these military exploits of the duke, in his second eclogue.

" Con mas illustre nombre los arneses
de los fieros Franceses abollava."
Obras, ed. de Herrera, p. 505.

¹⁸ Such was the power of the old duke of Najara, that he brought into the field on this occasion 1100 horse and 3000 foot, raised and equipped on his own estates. Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.*, epist. 507.

the mountains; and with them faded the last ray of hope for the restoration of the unfortunate monarch of Navarre.¹⁹

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On the 1st of April, in the following year, 1513, Ferdinand effected a truce with Louis the Twelfth, embracing their respective territories west of the Alps. It continued a year, and at its expiration was renewed for a similar time.²⁰ This arrangement, by which Louis sacrificed the interests of his ally the king of Navarre, gave Ferdinand ample time for settling and fortifying his new conquests; while it left the war open in a quarter, where, he well knew, others were more interested than himself to prosecute it with vigor. The treaty must be allowed to be more defensible on the score of policy,

Treaty of
Orthez.
1513.

¹⁹ Mémoires de Bayard, chap. 55, 56. — Fleurange, Mémoires, chap. 33. — Lebrija, De Bello Navarriensi, lib. 1, cap. 8, 9. — Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 21. — Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1512.

Jean and Catharine d'Albret passed the remainder of their days in their territories on the French side of the Pyrenees. They made one more faint and fruitless attempt to recover their dominions, during the regency of Cardinal Ximenes. (Carbajal, Anales, MS., cap. 12.) Broken in spirits, their health gradually declined, and neither of them long survived the loss of their crown. Jean died June 23d, 1517, and Catharine followed on the 12th of February of the next year; — happy, at least, that, as misfortune had no power to divide them in life, so they were not long separated by death. (Histoire du Royaume de Navarre, p. 643. — Alison, Annales de Navarra, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 20, 21.) Their bodies

sleep side by side in the cathedral church of Lescar, in their own dominions of Bearn; and their fate is justly noticed by the Spanish historians as one of the most striking examples of that stern decree, by which the sins of the fathers are visited on the children to the third and fourth generation.

²⁰ Flissan, Diplomatie Française, tom. i. p. 295. — Rymer, Fœdera, tom. xiii. pp. 350–352. — Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. vi. lib. 11, p. 82, lib. 12, p. 168. — Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 30, cap. 22. — “Fu cosa ridicola,” says Guicciardini in relation to this truce, “che nei medesimi giorni, che la si bandiva solennemente per tutta la Spagna, venne un araldo a significargli in nome del Re d’Inghilterra gli apparati potentissimi, che ei faceva per assaltare la Francia, e a sollecitare che egli medesimamente movesse, secondo che aveva promesso, la guerra dalla parte di Spagna.” Istoria, tom. vi. lib. 12, p. 84.

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than of good faith.²¹ The allies loudly inveighed against the treachery of their confederate, who had so unscrupulously sacrificed the common interest, by relieving France from the powerful diversion he was engaged to make on her western borders. It is no justification of wrong, that similar wrongs have been committed by others; but those who commit them (and there was not one of the allies, who could escape the imputation, amid the political profligacy of the times,) certainly forfeit the privilege to complain.²²

²¹ Francesco Vettori, the Florentine ambassador at the papal court, writes to Machiavelli, that he lay awake two hours that night speculating on the real motives of the Catholic king in making this truce, which, regarded simply as a matter of policy, he condemns *in toto*. He accompanies this with various predictions respecting the consequences likely to result from it. These consequences never occurred, however; and the failure of his predictions may be received as the best refutation of his arguments. Machiavelli, *Opere*, Lett. Famigl. Aprile 21, 1513.

²² Guicciardini, *Istoria*, tom. vi. lib. 11, pp. 81, 82. — Machiavelli, *Opere*, ubi supra. — Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.*, epist. 538.

On the 5th of April a treaty was concluded at Mechlin, in the names of Ferdinand, the king of England, the emperor, and the pope. (Rymer, *Fœdera*, tom. xiii. pp. 354–358.) The Castilian envoy, Don Luis Carroz, was not present at Mechlin, but it was ratified and solemnly sworn to by him, on behalf of his sovereign, in London, April 18th. (*Ibid.*, tom. xiii. p. 363.) By this treaty, Spain agreed to attack France in Guienne, while the other powers were to cooperate

by a descent on other quarters. (See also Dumont, *Corps Diplomatique*, tom. iv. part. 1, no. 79.) This was in direct contradiction of the treaty signed only five days before at Orthes, and, if made with the privity of King Ferdinand, must be allowed to be a gratuitous display of perfidy, not easily matched in that age. As such, of course, it is stigmatized by the French historians, that is, the later ones, for I find no comment on it in contemporary writers. (See Rapin, *History of England*, translated by Tindal, (London, 1785–9.) vol. ii. pp. 93, 94. Sismondi, *Hist. des Français*, tom. xv. p. 626.) Ferdinand, when applied to by Henry VIII. to ratify the acts of his minister, in the following summer, refused, on the ground that the latter had transcended his powers. (Herbert, *Life of Henry VIII.*, p. 29.) The Spanish writers are silent. His assertion derives some probability from the tenor of one of the articles, which provides, that, in case he refuses to confirm the treaty, it shall still be binding between England and the emperor; language which, as it anticipates, may seem to authorize, such a contingency.

Public treaties have, for obvious

CHAPTER
XXIII.Ferdinand
settles his
conquests.

Ferdinand availed himself of the interval of repose, now secured, to settle his new conquests. He had transferred his residence first to Burgos, and afterwards to Logroño, that he might be near the theatre of operations. He was indefatigable in raising reinforcements and supplies, and expressed his intention at one time, notwithstanding the declining state of his health, to take the command in person. He showed his usual sagacity in various regulations for improving the police, healing the domestic feuds, — as fatal to Navarre as the arms of its enemies, — and confirming and extending its municipal privileges and immunities, so as to conciliate the affections of his new subjects.²³

On the 23d of March, 1513, the estates of Navarre took the usual oaths of allegiance to King Ferdinand.²⁴ On the 15th of June, 1515, the Catholic monarch by a solemn act in cortes, held at Burgos, incorporated his new conquests into the kingdom of Castile.²⁵ The event excited some surprise, considering his more intimate relations with Aragon. But it was to the arms of Castile,

United with
Castile.

1515.

reasons, been generally received as the surest basis for history. One might well doubt this, who attempts to reconcile the multifarious discrepancies and contradictions in those of the period under review. The science of diplomacy, as then practised, was a mere game of finesse and falsehood, in which the more solemn the protestations of the parties, the more ground for distrusting their sincerity.

²³ Carta del Rey a Don Diego Deza, Nov. 12th, 1512, apud Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 236. — Aleson, Annales de Navar-

ra, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 16. — Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 13, 36, 43. — Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1512.

²⁴ Hist. du Royaume de Navarre, pp. 629, 630. — Aleson, Annales de Navarre, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 16. — Garibay, Compendio, tom. iii. lib. 30, cap. 1.

²⁵ Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 92. — Carbajal, Anales, MS., año 1515. — Garibay, Compendio, tom. iii. lib. 30, cap. 1. — Aleson, Annales de Navarre, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 7. — Sandoval, Hist. del Emp. Carlos V., tom. i. p. 26.

PART
II.

that he was chiefly indebted for the conquest ; and it was on her superior wealth and resources, that he relied for maintaining it. With this was combined the politic consideration, that the Navarrese, naturally turbulent and factious, would be held more easily in subordination when associated with Castile, than with Aragon, where the spirit of independence was higher, and often manifested itself in such bold assertion of popular rights, as falls most unwelcome on a royal ear. To all this must be added the despair of issue by his present marriage, which had much abated his personal interest in enlarging the extent of his patrimonial domains.

Foreign writers characterize the conquest of Navarre as a bold, unblushing usurpation, rendered more odious by the mask of religious hypocrisy. The national writers, on the other hand, have employed their pens industriously to vindicate it ; some endeavouring to rake a good claim for Castile out of its ancient union with Navarre, almost as ancient, indeed, as the Moorish conquest. Others resort to considerations of expediency, relying on the mutual benefits of the connexion to both kingdoms ; arguments, which prove little else than the weakness of the cause.²⁶ All lay more or less stress on the celebrated bull of Julius the Second,

²⁶ The honest canon Salazar de Mendoza, (taking the hint from Lebrija, indeed,) finds abundant warrant for Ferdinand's treatment of Navarre in the hard measure dealt by the Israelites of old to the people of Ephron, and to Sihon, king of the Amorites. (Monarquía, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 6.) It might

seem strange, that a Christian should look for authority in the practices of the race he so much abominates, instead of the inspired precepts of the Founder of his religion ! But in truth your thoroughbred casuist is apt to be very little of a Christian.

of February 18th, 1512, by which he excommunicated the sovereigns of Navarre, as heretics, schismatics, and enemies of the church, releasing their subjects from their allegiance, laying their dominions under an interdict, and delivering them over to any who should take, or had already taken, possession of them.²⁷ Most, indeed, are content to rest on this, as the true basis and original ground of the conquest. The total silence of the Catholic king respecting this document, before the invasion, and the omission of the national historians since to produce it, has caused much skepticism as to its existence. And, although its recent publication puts this beyond doubt, the instrument contains, in my judgment, strong internal evidence for distrusting the accuracy of the date affixed to it, which should have been posterior to the invasion; a circumstance materially affecting the argument; and which makes the papal sentence, not the original basis of the war, but only a sanction subsequently obtained to cover its injustice, and authorize retaining the fruits of it.²⁸

²⁷ See the original bull of Julius II. apud Mariana, *Hist. de España*, tom. ix. Apend. no. 2, ed. Valencia, 1796. — "Joannem et Catharinam," says the bull, in the usual conciliatory style of the Vatican, "perditionis filios, — excommunicatos, anathematizatos, maledictos, æterni supplicii reos," &c. &c. "Our armies swore terribly in Flanders, cried my uncle Toby, — but nothing to this. For my own part I could not have a heart to curse my dog so."

²⁸ The ninth volume of the splen-

did Valencian edition of Mariana, contains in the Appendix the famous bull of Julius II. of Feb. 18th, 1512, the original of which is to be found in the royal archives of Barcelona. The editor, Don Francisco Ortiz y Sanz, has accompanied it with an elaborate disquisition, in which he makes the apostolic sentence the great authority for the conquest. It was a great triumph, undoubtedly, to be able to produce the document, to which the Spanish historians had been so long challenged in vain by foreign wri-

PART
II.

But, whatever authority such a sanction may have had in the sixteenth century, it will find little respect in the present, at least beyond the limits of the Pyrenees. The only way, in which the question can be fairly tried, must be by those maxims of public law universally recognised as settling the intercourse of civilized nations; a science, indeed, imperfectly developed at that time, but in its general principles the same as now, founded, as these are, on the immutable basis of morality and justice.

Right of passage.

We must go back a step beyond the war, to the proximate cause of it. This was Ferdinand's demand of a free passage for his troops through Navarre. The demand was perfectly fair, and in

ters, and the existence of which might well be doubted, since no record of it appears on the papal register. (Abarca, *Reyes de Aragón*, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 21.) Paris de Grassis, *maître des cérémonies* of the chapel of Julius II. and Leo X., makes no mention of bull or excommunication, although very exact and particular in reporting such facts. (Bréquigny, *Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roy*, tom. ii. p. 570.) There is no reason that I know for doubting the genuineness of the present instrument. There are conclusive reasons to my mind, however, for rejecting its date, and assigning it to some time posterior to the conquest.

1st. The bull denounces John and Catharine as having openly joined themselves to Louis XII., and borne arms with him against England, Spain, and the church; a charge for which there was no pretence till five months later. — 2d. With this bull the editor has given another, dated Rome, July 21st, 1512, noticed by Peter Martyr. (*Opus Epist.*, epist. 497.) This latter is general in its import,

being directed against all nations whatever, engaged in alliance with France against the church. The sovereigns of Navarre are not even mentioned, nor the nation itself, any further than to warn it of the imminent danger in which it stood of falling into the schism. Now it is obvious, that this second bull, so general in its import, would have been entirely superfluous in reference to Navarre, after the publication of the first; while, on the other hand, nothing could be more natural than that these general menaces and warnings, having proved ineffectual, should be followed by the particular sentence of excommunication contained in the bull of February. — 3d. In fact, the bull of February makes repeated allusion to a former one, in such a manner as to leave no doubt that the bull of July 21st is intended; since not only the sentiments, but the very form of expression are perfectly coincident in both for whole sentences together. — 4th. Ferdinand makes no mention of the papal excommunication, either in his private correspondence, where he

ordinary cases would doubtless have been granted by a neutral nation. But that nation must, after all, be the only judge of its propriety, and Navarre may find a justification for her refusal on these grounds. First, that, in her weak and defenceless state, it was attended with danger to herself. Secondly, that, as by a previous and existing treaty with Spain, the validity of which was recognised in her new one of July 17th with France, she had agreed to refuse the right of passage to the latter nation, she consequently could not grant it to Spain without a violation of her neutrality.²⁹ Thirdly, that the demand of a passage, however just in itself, was coupled with another, the surrender of the fortresses, which must compromise the independence of the kingdom.³⁰

discusses the grounds of the war, or in his manifesto to the Navarrese, where it would have served his purpose quite as effectually as his arms. I say nothing of the negative evidence afforded by the silence of contemporary writers, as Lebrija, Carbajal, Bernaldez, and Martyr, who, while they allude to a sentence of excommunication passed in the consistory, or to the publication of the bull of July, give no intimation of the existence of that of February; a silence altogether inexplicable. The inference from all this is, that the date of the bull of February 18th, 1512, is erroneous; that it should be placed at some period posterior to the conquest, and consequently could not have served as the ground of it; but was probably obtained at the instance of the Catholic king, in order, by the odium which it threw on the sovereigns of Navarre, as excommunicate, to remove that un-

der which he lay himself, and at the same time secure what might be deemed a sufficient warrant for retaining his acquisitions.

Readers in general may think more time has been spent on the discussion than it is worth. But the important light, in which it is viewed by those who entertain more deference for a papal decree, is sufficiently attested by the length and number of disquisitions on it, down to the present century.

²⁹ Dumont, Corps Diplomatique, tom. iv. part. 1, no. 69.

³⁰ According to Galindez de Carbajal, only three fortresses were originally demanded by Ferdinand. (Anales, MS., año 1512.) He may have confounded the number with that said to have been finally conceded by the king of Navarre; a concession, however, which amounted to little, since it excluded by name two of the most important places required, and the sin-

PART
II.Imprudence
of Navarre.

But although, for these reasons, the sovereigns of Navarre were warranted in refusing Ferdinand's request, they were not therefore authorized to declare war against him, which they virtually did by entering into a defensive alliance with his enemy Louis the Twelfth, and by pledging themselves to make war on the English and their confederates; an article pointedly directed at the Catholic king.

It authorizes
war.

True, indeed, the treaty of Blois had not received the ratification of the Navarrese sovereigns; but it was executed by their plenipotentiaries duly authorized; and, considering the intimate intercourse between the two nations, was undoubtedly made with their full knowledge and concurrence. Under these circumstances, it was scarcely to be expected, that King Ferdinand, when an accident had put him in possession of the result of these negotiations, should wait for a formal declaration of hostilities, and thus deprive himself of the advantage of anticipating the blow of his enemy.

Gross abuse
of victory.

The right of making war would seem to include that of disposing of its fruits; subject, however, to those principles of natural equity, which should regulate every action, whether of a public or private nature. No principle can be clearer, for example, than that the penalty should be proportioned to the offence. Now that inflicted on the sovereigns of Navarre, which went so far as to dispossess them of their crown, and annihilate the politi-

cerity of which may well be doubted, if, as it would seem, it was not made till after the negotiations

with France had been adjusted. See Zurita, *Anales*, lib. 10, cap. 7.

cal existence of their kingdom, was such as nothing but extraordinary aggressions on the part of the conquered nation, or the self-preservation of the victors, could justify. As neither of these contingencies existed in the present case, Ferdinand's conduct must be regarded as a flagrant example of the abuse of the rights of conquest. We have been but too familiar, indeed, with similar acts of political injustice, and on a much larger scale, in the present civilized age. But, although the number and splendor of the precedents may blunt our sensibility to the atrocity of the act, they can never constitute a legitimate warrant for its perpetration.

While thus freely condemning Ferdinand's conduct in this transaction, I cannot go along with those, who, having inspected the subject less minutely, are disposed to regard it as the result of a cool, premeditated policy, from the outset. The propositions originally made by him to Navarre appear to have been conceived in perfect good faith. The requisition of the fortresses, impudent as it may seem, was nothing more than had been before made in Isabella's time, when it had been granted, and the security subsequently restored, as soon as the emergency had passed away.³¹ The alternative proposed, of entering into the Holy League, presented many points of view so favorable to Navarre, that Ferdinand, ignorant, as he then was, of the precise footing on which she stood with

³¹ Aleson, *Annales de Navarre*, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 1, 3. — Garibay, *Compendio*, tom. iii. lib. 29, cap. 13.

PART
II.

France, might have seen no improbability in her closing with it. Had either alternative been embraced, there would have been no pretext for the invasion. Even when hostilities had been precipitated by the impolitic conduct of Navarre, Ferdinand (to judge, not from his public manifestoes only, but from his private correspondence) would seem to have at first contemplated holding the country, only till the close of his French expedition.³² But the facility of retaining these conquests, when once acquired, was too strong a temptation. It was easy to find some plausible pretext to justify it, and obtain such a sanction from the highest authority, as should veil the injustice of the transaction from the world, — and from his own eyes. And that these were blinded is but too true, if, as an Aragonese historian declares, he could remark on his death-bed, “that, independently of the conquest having been undertaken at the instance of the sovereign pontiff, for the extirpation of the schism, he felt his conscience as easy in keeping it, as in keeping his crown of Aragon.”³³

³² See King Ferdinand's letter, July 20th, and his manifesto, July 30th, 1512, apud Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 235. — Lebri-

ja, De Bello Navariensi, lib. 1, cap. 7.

³³ Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 21.

Authorities
for the his-
tory of Na-
varre.

I have made use of three authorities exclusively devoted to Navarre, in the present History. 1. “L'Histoire du Royaume de Navarre, par un des Secrétaires Interprètes de sa Majesté.” Paris,

1596. 8vo. This anonymous work, from the pen of one of Henry IV.'s secretaries, is little else than a meagre compilation of facts, and these deeply colored by the national prejudices of the writer. It de-

rives some value from this circumstance, however, in the contrast it affords to the Spanish version of the same transactions. 2. A tract entitled "*Ælii Antonii Nebrissensis de Bello Navariensi Libri Duo.*" It covers less than thirty pages folio, and is chiefly occupied, as the title imports, with the military events of the conquest by the duke of Alva. It was originally incorporated in the volume containing its learned author's version, or rather paraphrase of Pulgar's Chronicle, with some other matters; and first appeared from the press of the younger Lebrija, "apud inclytam Granatam, 1545." 3. But the great work illustrating the history of Navarre is the "*Annales del Reyno*"; of which the best edition is that in seven volumes, folio, from the press of Ibañez, Pamplona, 1766. Its typographical execution would be creditable to any country. The three first volumes were written by Moret, whose profound acquaintance with the antiquities of his nation

has made his book indispensable to the student of this portion of its history. The fourth and fifth are the continuation of his work by Francisco de Aleson, a Jesuit who succeeded Moret as historiographer of Navarre. The two last volumes are devoted to investigations illustrating the antiquities of Navarre, from the pen of Moret, and are usually published separately from his great historic work. Aleson's continuation, extending from 1350 to 1527, is a production of considerable merit. It shows extensive research on the part of its author, who, however, has not always confined himself to the most authentic and accredited sources of information. His references exhibit a singular medley of original contemporary documents, and apocryphal authorities of a very recent date. Though a Navarrese, he has written with the impartiality of one, in whom local prejudices were extinguished in the more comprehensive national feelings of a Spaniard.

CONSEJERÍA DE CULTURA

JUNTA DE ANDALUCÍA

CHAPTER XXIV.

DEATH OF GONSALVO DE CORDOVA. — ILLNESS AND DEATH OF
FERDINAND. — HIS CHARACTER.

1513 — 1516.

Gonsalvo ordered to Italy. — General Enthusiasm. — The King's Distrust. — Gonsalvo in Retirement. — Decline of his Health. — His Death, and noble Character. — Ferdinand's Illness. — It increases. — He dies. — His Character. — A Contrast to Isabella. — The Judgment of his Contemporaries.

PART II.

Maximilian's
pretensions.

NOTWITHSTANDING the good order which King Ferdinand maintained in Castile by his energetic conduct, as well as by his policy of diverting the effervescing spirits of the nation to foreign enterprise, he still experienced annoyance from various causes. Among these were Maximilian's pretensions to the regency, as paternal grandfather of the heir apparent. The emperor, indeed, had more than once threatened to assert his preposterous claims to Castile in person; and, although this Quixotic monarch, who had been tilting against windmills all his life, failed to excite any powerful sensation, either by his threats or his promises, it furnished a plausible pretext for keeping alive a faction hostile to the interests of the Catholic king.

In the winter of 1509 an arrangement was made with the emperor, through the mediation of Louis the Twelfth, by which he finally relinquished his pretensions to the regency of Castile, in consideration of the aid of three hundred lances, and the transfer to him of the fifty thousand ducats, which Ferdinand was to receive from Pisa.¹ No bribe was too paltry for a prince, whose means were as narrow, as his projects were vast and chimerical. Even after this pacification, the Austrian party contrived to disquiet the king, by maintaining the archduke Charles's pretensions to the government in the name of his unfortunate mother; until at length, the Spanish monarch came to entertain not merely distrust, but positive aversion for his grandson; while the latter, as he advanced in years, was taught to regard Ferdinand as one, who excluded him from his rightful inheritance by a most flagrant act of usurpation.²

Ferdinand's suspicious temper found other grounds for uneasiness, where there was less warrant for it, in his jealousy of his illustrious subject Gonsalvo de Cordova. This was particularly the case, when circumstances had disclosed the full extent of that general's popularity. After the defeat of Ravenna, the pope and the other allies of Ferdinand urged him in the most earnest manner to send the Great Captain into Italy, as the only man capable of checking the French arms, and restoring the for-

Gonsalvo ordered to Italy.

¹ Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 29, cap. 21. — Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 8, cap. 45, 47. ² Zurita, Anales, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 55, 69. — Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 531.

PART
II.
1512.
May.

tunes of the league. The king, trembling for the immediate safety of his own dominions, gave a reluctant assent, and ordered Gonsalvo to hold himself in readiness to take command of an army to be instantly raised for Italy.³

General
enthusiasm.

These tidings were received with enthusiasm by the Castilians. Men of every rank pressed forward to serve under a chief, whose service was itself sufficient passport to fame. "It actually seemed," says Martyr, "as if Spain were to be drained of all her noble and generous blood. Nothing appeared impossible, or even difficult under such a leader. Hardly a cavalier in the land, but would have thought it a reproach to remain behind. Truly marvellous," he adds, "is the authority which he has acquired over all orders of men!"⁴

Such was the zeal with which men enlisted under his banner, that great difficulty was found in completing the necessary levies for Navarre, then menaced by the French. The king, alarmed at this, and relieved from apprehensions of immediate danger to Naples, by subsequent advices from that country, sent orders greatly reducing the number of forces to be raised. But this had little effect, since every man, who had the means, preferred acting as a volunteer under the Great Captain to any other service, however gainful; and many a poor cavalier was there, who expended his little all, or

³ Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.*, epist. 486. — *Crónica del Gran Capitan*, lib. 3, cap. 7. — Zurita, *Anales*, tom. vi. lib. 10, cap. 2. —

Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 3, p. 288.

⁴ *Opus Epist.*, epist. 487.

incurred a heavy debt, in order to appear in the field in a style becoming the chivalry of Spain.

CHAPTER
XXIV.

Ferdinand's former distrust of his general was now augmented tenfold by this evidence of his unbounded popularity. He saw in imagination much more danger to Naples from such a subject, than from any enemy, however formidable. He had received intelligence, moreover, that the French were in full retreat towards the north. He hesitated no longer, but sent instructions to the Great Captain at Cordova, to disband his levies, as the expedition would be postponed till after the present winter; at the same time inviting such as chose to enlist in the service of Navarre.⁵

The king's
distrust.

1512.
August.

These tidings were received with indignant feelings by the whole army. The officers refused, nearly to a man, to engage in the proposed service. Gonsalvo, who understood the motives of this change in the royal purpose, was deeply sensible to what he regarded as a personal affront. He, however, enjoined on his troops implicit obedience to the king's commands. Before dismissing them, as he knew that many had been drawn into expensive preparations far beyond their means, he distributed largesses among them, amounting to the immense sum, if we may credit his biographers, of one hundred thousand ducats. "Never stint your hand," said he to his steward, who remonstrated on the magnitude of the donative; "there is no mode

⁵ Giovio, *Vita Magni Gonsalvi*, lib. 3, p. 289. — *Chronica del Gran Capitán*, lib. 3, cap. 7, 8. — Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.*, fol. 38. — Peter Martyr, *Opus Epist.*, epist. 498.